1 Soft law is the generally recognised term for offi cial instruments of various forms which are non-binding and seek to guide, clarify or affect administrative action. Soft law is most often distinguished from ' hard law ' such as statutes and regulations which are binding and set out legally enforceable standards, duties and powers. Another term for guidelines is ' interposed law ' , which Professor William Twining differentiated from ' soft law ' in his keynote lecture at the 2014 Osgoode Forum, 10 May 2014, in Toronto, Ontario. He defi ned interposed law as including the ' descriptions of law that tax administrators develop and that come between the tax code and the practice of tax administration by administrators ' . The importance of this ' interposed law ' was highlighted by reference to a hypothetical investor who, in making investment decisions, would analyse the risks/benefi ts of the investment not only on the ' state law ' but also the very important ' interposed laws ' that are of practical importance. 2 Agraira v Canada [ 2013 ] 2 SCR 559 ( ' Agraira ' ).
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Legitimate Expectations in Canada: Soft Law and Tax Administration
SAS ANSARI AND LORNE SOSSIN T HIS CHAPTER EXAMINES the relationship between legitimate expectations and soft law. In what circumstances can an agency ' s guidelines create law -or at least legally enforceable expectations ? At fi rst glance, the answer would appear obvious. The key reason for developing soft law is to provide guidance and transparency as to the process (and sometimes the substance) of administrative action. Soft law by its nature gives rise to expectations. Whether those expectations, in turn, give rise to legal effects is decidedly less clear. In fact, this question has vexed Canadian administrative law. Nowhere are questions of soft law 1 and legitimate expectations more salient than in the context of tax administration.
We canvass the relationship between legitimate expectations and soft law in the context of Canadian tax administration. The analysis proceeds in three parts. In the fi rst part, we consider the important roles of soft law in a tax administration system premised on self-assessment. Within this analysis, we list and describe six sources of soft law in the tax administration context. In the second part, we explore the development of the doctrine of legitimate expectations in Canada, and the implications of the Supreme Court of Canada ' s (SCC) most considered treatment of soft law and legitimate expectations in Agraira v Canada . 2 The third part of the chapter analyses when (and pursuant to which principles) soft law in the tax administration context (eg information circular, interpretation bulletin, or advance judgment) may give rise to a legitimate expectation.
We conclude that Canadian administrative law has only begun to grapple with legitimate expectations, and that its development in the context of soft law represents an important catalyst for sorting out a more coherent and transparent framework for the review of administrative action.
SOFT LAW AND TAX ADMINISTRATION
The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) is a large administrative agency 3 that performs various functions, including both ' judicial rights-determining functions ' and ' administrative rights determining functions ' , 4 in pursuit of the administration and enforcement of the Income Tax Act ( ITA ). 5 The ITA is ' complex ' 6 and ' convoluted ' , 7 and is fi lled with provisions that are ambiguous and unclear. 8 The CRA recognises the lack of clarity in the ITA . 9 The words of Justice Learned Hand are quite appropriate in describing the complexity of tax law: 10 The words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception -couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold ofleave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time.
Complexity is increased by tax law ' s secondary-law nature. 11 Tax law must take the legal world (which gives legal signifi cance to real-world events and actions, on which tax law then operates) as it fi nds it. Unless the ITA expressly or by necessary implication modifi es the legal terrain, tax law only applies after the other laws have exerted their effects. This is a daunting task even for seasoned tax lawyers. Not surprisingly, taxpayers often do not understand the tax consequences of their choices and life-events. In recognition of this complexity and the reality of inherent uncertainties in statutory interpretation, the Mintz Committee recommended that taxpayers and the Minister be allowed to enter into compromise settlements on the basis of litigation risk. 12 This complexity could be signifi cantly reduced, if not resolved, by applying professional expertise (lawyers, accountants, etc) 13 but for the fact that, in order to function as designed, Canada ' s income tax system must (at least passively) engage with over 26 million individual taxpayers annually. 14 The majority of taxpayers have no legal or tax experience or training and cannot afford to retain tax experts (nor should they be required to within the context of a self-assessing system). The onus of correctly interpreting the law, identifying legally signifi cant facts, and applying the law to these factscoming up with the correct amount of tax owing -is on the taxpayer. 15 Where the taxpayer fails at this, s/he may face interest charges 16 . 22 The ITA in PDF form is 3,236 pages long and the Regulations take up another 1,645 pages. The text of the four sections dealing with ' Income and Loss from an Offi ce or Employment ' , the simplest of the provisions in the ITA , covers 50 of those pages. The CRA has issued a number of guidelines to deal with these four sections, totaling another 50 pages of explanations covering only small portions of those four sections. These four sections do not cover other sources of income, investment income, excluded amounts, deductions, credits, or other matters commonly encountered by most taxpayers. 23 See Ellis (n 4) 135 where such functions are said to be performed by the ' policy and legislative department ' of the ' portfolio ministry ' of the executive branch of government. 24 The fi rst such publication by Canada Revenue (as it then was) was in 1970, and consisted of two series of publications: ' Information Circulars ' and ' Interpretation Bulletins ' . 25 The TCC in Dunlap v The Queen 52 DTC 2053 , held that the ' principal purpose of the bulletins is to inform the public of policies which the [Minister] has adopted for the administration of legislation as broad and complex as the Income Tax Act ' . tax liability. 18 CRA employees who judge and analyse taxpayers ' tax returns are faced with the same lack of certainty and clarity in interpreting and applying the complex and convoluted provisions of the ITA , often with little more expertise and education than most taxpayers. 19 One policy of tax legislation is the creation of tax law that is ' certain, predictable and fair, so that taxpayers can intelligently order their affairs ' . 20 Meeting this policy goal in a ' self-assessment system, which requires individuals without legal training to work through a complex series of provisions [ … ] for which maximum guidance is necessary ' 21 is in part achieved through the creation and distribution of detailed guidelines. 22 The CRA, in order to serve its various functions, ' distills from the statutory text the particulars of the legislator ' s policy intentions, and drafts and " enacts " the directive and the rules and regulations necessary to give effect to those particulars ' . 23 These agency-created documents, referred herein collectively as ' guidelines ' , are the focus of this chapter. 24 This soft law is used in the course of giving effect to the statutory rights granted and obligations imposed by the ITA . 25 They guide the decisions of various CRA employees involved in determining the existence of and the outcome of disputes between taxpayers and the state that arise in the ordinary course of administrating the ITA . They are also heavily employed by lawyers and tax professionals in providing services to taxpayers, and are used by taxpayers themselves to make sense of the Canadian income tax 26 system. This is why soft law plays as crucial a role in the smooth functioning of a self-assessment system, the exercise of discretion by CRA offi cials, and the compliance efforts of taxpayers.
Guidelines and the Integrity of the Tax System
Canada ' s self-assessment system relieves the tax authority of the duties normally imposed on assessors freeing up resources for administration and enforcement. 26 This is not without cost. A self-assessment system provides greater opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion, undermining the tax base and reducing government revenues. 27 Tax avoidance and evasion increase where, inter alia , 28 , 29 the tax system is perceived as being unfair. 30 In a self-assessment system, ' fairness and even handedness by the tax authority are required to encourage integrity among taxpayers ' , and perceptions of unfair treatment by the tax authority have an ' important infl uence on future levels of tax evasion ' . 31 The importance of taxpayer trust within a self-assessment system, and the effects of perceptions of fairness, is well recognised by the Canadian Government and courts. 32 In an increasingly complex and changing legal landscape, actors ought to be able to rely on law with some certainty. 33 Where the law involves administrative discretion, 34 is complex, or is otherwise uncertain, the public will have diffi culty in predicting how discretion will 35 See Sch ø nberg (n 30) 14. 36 be exercised or the law will be interpreted and applied. 35 Clearly worded and easy to understand representations by public authorities will, in cases of ambiguity, serve to guide an individual ' s actions and decisions. 36 Therefore, how the law treats soft law may undermine taxpayers ' perceptions of fairness. 37 For example, the failure of courts to allow into evidence such things as government policy concerning the application of certain rules of evidence of the treatment of similar taxpayers is seen as having a negative effect. 38
Soft Law and Tax
There are a large number of tax guidelines that could be considered for the purposes of this analysis. The authority for developing soft law is not expressly found in the ITA , but is implied by provisions empowering the Minister to administer the ITA . A small subset of these sources of soft law includes:
Income Tax There are other publications that are publicly available even if designed for use by expert specialists rather than members of the public. This category includes the CRA Appeals Manual, and other statements and communications by the CRA (both written and oral, and formal and informal). 40 Relevant statements and publications could also include those made by the Department of Finance (for example comfort letters, news releases, tax bulletins, technical papers).
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41 Guides are often accompanied with forms and directions on how to fi ll out and fi le those forms. 42 ITFs state that they are updated when interpretations change or major developments occur, leading a reader to trust that the information is current. ITFs also expressly state that the folio chapters can be relied upon as an accurate summary of the CRA ' s interpretation of the law -see for example the fi rst paragraph in the Medical Expense Tax Credit Folio -S1-F1-C1, available online at www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/tchncl/ncmtx/fl s/s1/f1/s1-f1-c1-eng.html . 43 See for example paragraphs 3 to 5 in IC12-1, ' GST/HST Compliance Refund Holds ' , available online at www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/ic12-1/ic12-1-12e.pdf ; IC00-1R4 [7] .
Of the above, ITFs and ICs are intended for use by both taxpayers and tax professionals, ITTNs and ITs are intended for tax professionals, Tax Guides and Pamphlets are intended for taxpayers and the general public, 41 and ATRs are applicable to specifi c transactions. Despite the distinction in use, all of them are written in clear language and appear easy to understand/ apply by taxpayers without recourse to tax professionals. ITFs, 42 ITTNs, and ITs are subject to general notices that appear to be aimed at limiting the reasonableness of replying on the information they contain, often referring the reader back to the ITA, Regulations, and relevant cases. ICs are not subject to a general notice, though specifi c ICs contain statements as to when they do and do not apply, including that they are not meant to replace the spirit or intent of legislation. 43 Tax Guides and Pamphlets and ATRs do not contain any notices, but ATRs are issued to taxpayers and are considered by the CRA to be binding only for that one taxpayer and only within the facts detailed. Despite the various notices, the wording of which is different in the various soft-law instruments, given the complexity of income tax law and the vast volume of ' incomprehensible ' text in the statute and regulations, we would suggest that reliance may be necessarily invited by the simple act of making available more accessible and understandable descriptions of the law.
In light of the range of sources of soft law in the context of tax administration, discussed above, how should the legal effects of these instruments be understood ? Are instruments intended for use by tax professionals to be considered as giving rise to greater/lesser expectation than those intended for taxpayers ? Are instruments which are not publicly circulated (but which are not secret either) be considered to create greater/lesser expectation than those posted on the CRA website ? Given the disclaimers that routinely accompany all these instruments, to the effect that none of them ' replace the law ' , should they give rise to legal consequences ? Is a taxpayer who relies on the content of these instruments to his/her detriment within his/her rights to seek a remedy on the basis an expectation has been frustrated ?
In order to answer these fundamental questions, it is necessary review the treatment of legitimate expectation in Canadian administrative law. 
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND SOFT LAW
Soft law can be described both by what it is and what it is not. 44 In the fi rst (descriptive) sense, soft law includes a wide range of instruments, from guidelines to circulars, policy statements to protocols, which infl uence a decision-making process. All of the CRA guidelines outlined above qualify as soft law (at least on this standard). In the second (legal) sense, soft law refers to any rules which affect decision-making but are by design or definition non-binding, and so not ' law ' . In the Canadian context, ' hard law ' would represent all statutory provisions and rules emanating from instruments delegated by statutes to be binding (eg regulations, by-laws, etc). Hard law, in other words, is what authorises CRA offi cials, on behalf of the Minister, to make decisions. Soft law represents everything else that shapes the resulting exercise of the discretion created by hard law.
Because the CRA itself promulgates the guidelines discussed above, is it reasonable for taxpayers and tax preparers to expect the CRA to rely and make decisions based on their contents ? This question is not as straightforward as it sounds. The guidelines themselves make apparent that they are not intended to replace the law. How can offi cials be held accountable for applying or not applying non-binding instruments ? However, it appears to be unfair for those interacting with CRA offi cials to be given information about how the CRA will interpret and apply the ITA if those offi cials can disregard the information at any time for any reason. Further, the CRA does not treat these different instruments alike. While ITTNs are simply informational, the ITs are clearly intended to disclose how certain matters are likely to be approached by the CRA. ITFs appear to be hybrid instruments which inform and advise. Tax administration needs a spectrum of legal relevance rather than an on/off switch that would simply create or not create legally relevant expectations.
Legitimate Expectations and the Supreme Court of Canada
Canada lacks a detailed conceptual framework for the application of legitimate expectations. 45 expectations by the SCC took place in Martineau in the context of soft law. 46 In that decision, the majority of the Court provided a closer analysis of the duty to act fairly based on the English fairness doctrine. An inmate in a federal penitentiary challenged a conviction for a disciplinary offence relying in part on departures from a Commissioner ' s Directive providing procedural safeguards/rights. The majority referred to Lord Denning ' s decision in Schmidt , 47 where the doctrine of legitimate expectations was fi rst introduced in English law. In discussing the role and effect of ' fairness ' , the majority stated that ' natural justice and fairness are principles of judicial process deemed by the common law to be annexed to legislation, with a view to bringing statutory provisions in conformity with the common law requirements of justice ' . 48 The majority held that, between the poles of ' purely ministerial decisions ' on board policy grounds that attract no procedural protection and judiciallike functions that attract substantial procedural safeguards, 49 there exists ' a myriad decision-making processes with a fl exible gradation of procedural fairness through the administrative spectrum ' . 50 Dealing specifi cally with the application of the Commissioner ' s Directives, the majority stated that the courts are not concerned with:
breaches of the prison rules, but whether there has been a breach of the duty to act fairly in all circumstances, … the rules are of some importance in determining [the question of fairness] as [they are] an indication of the views of the prison authorities as to the degree of procedural protection to be extended to inmates. 51 The Court attempted to bring together Canadian and English principles in Old St Boniface , 52 a case arising in the disparate setting of municipal re-zoning. The majority discussed the appellant ' s argument based on ' a legitimate expectation of consultation ' created by the ' conduct of the Committee ' . 53 The majority stated that the English principle merely extends the reach of the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness to give ' a party affected by the decision of a public offi cial an opportunity to make representations in circumstances in which there otherwise would be no such opportunity ' . 54 58 This was an appeal from a British Colombia Court of Appeal decision that extended the reach of the legitimate expectations doctrine by restricting the Federal Government Executive ' s ability to introduce a Bill into Parliament (aimed at reducing a budget defi cit) in breach of an agreement between the Federal and Provincial Governments. The Supreme Court found that the Government had abided by the agreement and, since the agreement ' s funding formula referred to the statute, it could be validly amended by statute. In dealing with the doctrine of legitimate expectations, the Court referred to Old St Boniface , and then drew a distinction between the procedural right to be consulted and the substantive right to give consent. The Court concluded that the creation of substantive rights through the doctrine of legitimate expectations is not supported in Canadian or English cases. The doctrine was said to be part of the rules of procedural fairness, and where it is applicable, it can create additional rights to make representations or to be consulted. The Court concluded that legitimate expectations could not operate to fetter the decision following the representation or consultation. Further, the rules of procedural fairness do not bind a body ' exercising purely legislative functions ' . 59 In other words, one government could not bind future governments by making promises about legislation or policy.
In Baker , 60 the Court attempted to embed legitimate expectations in the broader duty of fairness and invoked it as one of fi ve non-exhaustive and non-hierarchal ' factors ' a court should consider in determining the degree of fairness owed in a particular context. The Court addressed legitimate expectations in the context of soft law in this analysis and held that the failure of the decision-maker to follow the applicable guideline or applicable international covenants and agreements did not render the exercise of discretion unfair. 61 The Court dealt with the legal effect of the publicly available guidelines. Here, the Immigration Manual used by immigration offi cers provided various criteria and considerations to be assessed in exercising their discretion. In obiter , the Court outlined the doctrine for purposes of determining the content of the duty of fairness. After confi rming that a legitimate expectation ' does not create substantive rights ' , 62 and distinguishing the ' object of the expectation from its legal effects ' , 63 the Court stated that: a legitimate expectation that a certain procedure will be followed [means that] this procedure will be required by the duty of fairness … [and] a legitimate expectation that a certain result will be reached [ … ] may require more extensive procedural rights than would otherwise be accorded. 64 The Court clarifi ed that the doctrine is based on the principle that ' it will generally be unfair for [administrative decision-makers] to act in contravention of representations as to procedure, or to backtrack on substantive promises without according signifi cant procedural rights ' . 65 For the Court in Baker , the guidelines related more to the substantive review of the reasonableness of the Immigration Offi cer ' s exercise of discretion. The Court held that ' the guidelines are a useful indicator of what constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the power conferred by the provision, and the fact that this decision was contrary to the directives is of great help in assessing whether the decision was an unreasonable exercise ' of discretion. 66 Even the discretion to make a decision that is wholly a matter of judgment is granted within certain boundaries. Such a decision must be made ' following an approach that respects [the purpose of the discretion and the values it advances] ' . 67 In this case, the guidelines refl ected the proper approach (which also incorporated the approach set out in an international convention to which Canada was a signatory) and the decision ' s inconsistency with the guideline and the international convention led to the conclusion that the decision was unreasonable.
Subsequently, the Court explored whether a fi nding of unreasonableness could fl ow from promissory estoppel if a promise by a decision-maker gives rise to detrimental reliance. In Mount Sinai , 68 a government offi cial committed to a process resulting in the relocation of a hospital and then reneged on its approval for the relocation. The majority of the SCC held that it was unnecessary to decide whether a legitimate expectation was created by the Government ' s representations, and allowed the appeal based upon its interpretation of the applicable statute. Writing for the majority of the Court, Bastarache J held that the Minister was bound by the prior commitment as the initial exercise of the relevant discretion. 69 At that point, the Court held the discretion was, in effect, exhausted, and the subsequent attempt to reverse the decision on the relocation was not authorised and not valid. 70 Binnie J, in a concurring decision with which McLachlin CJ agreed, concluded that the Minister ' s decision was ' patently unreasonable [ … and] reached by a process that was demonstrably unfair ' and, therefore, an abuse of discretion. 71 The respondents were found to have worked closely with the regulators for a long time, developing a ' web of understandings and incremental arrangements with the concurrence indeed the encouragement of successive Ministers ' . 72 Binnie J concluded that, where representations are detrimentally relied upon, an estoppel will operate unless a statute or an overriding public interest dictates a contrary result. 73 Alternatively, an unreasonable 74 decision may be quashed and, absent an overriding public interest to the contrary, mandamus might then issue to compel the decisionmaker to exercise his or her discretion afresh and according to law. 75 The minority addressed the respondent ' s argument that legitimate expectations can give substantive results where the result is not contrary to law and is otherwise within the power of the Minister. While the respondent argued that the doctrine was evolving, 76 the minority noted that there is a difference between the Canadian and English contexts. In England, it was stated that the doctrine of legitimate expectations ' performs a number of functions that in Canada are kept distinct ' . 77 , 1995 ) 417 . The editors state that adding estoppel-type requirements to legitimate expectations would ' involve unfair discrimination between those who were and were not aware of the representation and would benefi t the well-informed or well-advised [and] would also encourage undesirable administrative practice by too readily relieving decision-makers of the normal consequences of their actions ' (at 426). 83 Mount Sinai (n 68) [32] . 84 An attack on such decisions must be based on abuse of discretion: Mount Sinai (n 68), [33] . 85 Mount Sinai (n 68) [34] .
a comprehensive code that embraced the full gamut of administrative relief from procedural fairness at the low end through ' enhanced ' procedural fairness based on conduct, thence onwards to estoppel (though it is not to be called that) including substantive relief at the high end. 78 The high end of relief was seen as an inappropriate intervention in government policy in Canada, absent a challenge under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . 79 The minority stated that the doctrine of legitimate expectations looks to the public authority ' s clear, unambiguous, and unqualifi ed conduct in exercising power, and requires that the expectation does not confl ict with the authority ' s statutory jurisdiction. 80 Unlike estoppel, legitimate expectations do not require the person to show awareness of, reliance on, or detriment resulting from the relied on conduct. 81 This is because the focus of legitimate expectations is the promotion of ' regularity, predictability, and certainty in government ' s dealing with the public ' . 82 The minority felt that the decision in CAP , referring to Old St Boniface , closed the door on substantive relief, but also stated that if ' the Court is to give substantive relief, more demanding conditions precedent must be fulfi lled than are presently required by the doctrine of legitimate expectation ' . 83 One limitation on the legitimate expectations doctrine is that purely ministerial decisions on broad grounds of public policy will not typically afford any procedural protections. 84 Another limitation is that a public body exercising legislative functions is only liable to judicial supervision as a result of a successful Charter challenge. 85 306 Legitimate expectations have also sometimes been labelled to emphasise ' reasonableness ' rather than ' legitimacy ' . 86 In Moreau, 87 for example, it was argued that the applicant had a ' reasonable expectation ' that inquiry fi ndings into her conduct as a judge would not result in her dismissal and that she would continue in her role after the impugned action. There is nothing in the facts relied on to locate the basis of these ' reasonable expectations ' in ' clear, unambiguous, and unqualifi ed ' representations or conduct of the decision-maker. The SCC did not inquire whether there were any legitimate expectations on the basis of which relief was sought, but simply held that ' the doctrine of reasonable expectations does not create substantive rights, and does not fetter the discretion of a statutory decision-maker ' . 88 The doctrine was stated only to create and apply to procedural rights, and then only when ' a party affected by an administrative decision can establish a legitimate expectation that a certain procedure would be followed ' . 89 A number of SCC decisions refer to the doctrine of legitimate expectations in passing. In Mackin , 90 dealing with the status of supernumerary judges, the Court did not fi nd that a legitimate expectation had been established, but went on to note that even if one had, the doctrine does not apply to purely legislative functions and does not ' operate to entitle the [person] to a substantive as opposed to procedural remedy ' . 91 In CUPE , 92 the Court was called upon to determine what factors were relevant and irrelevant to a particular exercise of discretion by the Minister of Labour to appoint interest arbitrators, and looked to the history of the legislation to identify its purpose. 93 The majority held that ' the conditions precedent to the application of the doctrine [of legitimate expectations] were not established in this case ' 94 but nonetheless commented on the reach of the doctrine. The majority described legitimate expectations as ' an extension of the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness ' that considers the conduct of an administrative decision-maker in the exercise of a discretionary power including ' established practices, conduct or representations ' that can be characterised as clear and has in fact produced reasonable expectations of procedure or a certain benefi t. 95 The question of ' legitimacy ' arises Legitimate Expectations in Canada 307 96 Ibid, [131] . 97 Canada v Mavi 2011 SCC 30 ( ' Mavi ' ). 98 Ibid, [44] . 99 Ibid, [65] . 100 Ibid, [66] . 101 Ibid, [68] . 102 See Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2015 SCC 61 , where the majority of the Court reiterated that guidelines, though useful, are not legally binding and are not intended to be exhaustive or restrictive. The Court concluded that a discretionary decisionmaker who limited the criteria to be considered only to those set out in the Ministry guidelines acted unreasonably. 103 The issues related to the doctrine of legitimate expectations were considered to be incidental to the central issue of whether the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) chose the correct standard of review and applied it properly: Agraira [ 2013 ] 2 SCR 559 [3], [47] . 104 Relief could be granted where the person ' satisfi es the Minister that their presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest ' : ibid [42] . 105 Ibid, [2]. when looking to whether or not the expectations confl ict with a statutory duty. 96 In the result, the majority characterised past practices in the appointment of arbitrators as an implied requirement of the appointment power and the Minister, by failing to adhere to those practices, reached a patently unreasonable decision. In Mavi , 97 the SCC considered the decision of Ontario to adopt certain procedures in light of federal statutory requirements, including whether Ontario had behaved reasonably or had fettered its discretion. The Court held that the legislation left Ontario with a measure of discretion, and that the procedure adopted by Ontario was compatible with the statute 98 without confl icting with the intended scope of the discretion. 99 The importance of policy as a guide to civil servants was recognised by the Court, as was the Minister ' s entitlement to set policy within legal limits. 100 The Court stated that, in order to give rise to legitimate expectations, representations have to be within the scope of the decision-maker ' s authority. Reliance was held not to be required. 101 The most recent 102 and most potentially far-reaching discussion of legitimate expectations by the SCC is that in Agraira , 103 which relates specifically to soft law. This unanimous judgment of a seven-member Court was concerned with a Minister ' s discretionary decision, required to be exercised after considering the ' national interest ' . 104 The appellant argued that the Minister took an excessively narrow view of the phrase ' national interest ' , and failed to meet a legitimate expectation that certain procedures would be followed and certain factors taken into account. 105 While a staff briefi ng note indicated the petition should be granted, the Minister denied relief. The lower court had held that the Minister ' s reasons did not address the questions listed in the guidelines or factors identifi ed by the courts as relevant. The SCC considered the reasonableness of the Minister ' s decision and referred to the guidelines as part of the reasonableness 308 Sas Ansari and Lorne Sossin 106 Guidelines can serve at least two distinct purposes. One is to inform the reasonableness analysis of a discretionary decision; the other is to determine whether the process was fair or not. Here, the broader context of the statutory provision ' includes the Guidelines ' which, although not law ' in the strict sense ' , are ' a useful indicator of what constitutes a reasonable interpretation ' of the particular provision: ibid [85] . 107 . 113 As at 1 January 2016, Agraira had been cited in over 300 cases. 114 The majority of the decisions cited Agraira when dealing with (i) standard of review analysis, (ii) reasonableness of decisions, (iii) suffi ciency of reasons, (iv) humanitarian and compassionate ground considerations under Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , (v) presumptions of consistent expression in statutes and modern rule of statutory interpretation, or (vi) a court of appeal ' s role when reviewing JR decision of lower court. assessment. 106 The Court stated that, rather than being a fi xed code, the guidelines contained ' a set of factors, which appeared to be relevant and reasonable ' for the exercise of the particular discretion. 107 The Minister was not required to apply them formulaically, but they should have ' guided the exercise of his discretion and assisted in framing a fair administrative process for such applications ' and, as such, assisted the Court in understanding the Minister ' s ' implied interpretation of the " national interest " ' . 108 The doctrine of legitimate expectations was stated to be a ' particular face of procedural fairness ' that can work to expand the procedural protections otherwise available. 109 Legitimate expectations cannot give rise to substantive rights; courts are limited to granting only procedural relief. 110 In Agraira , the Court held that the guidelines, which were publicly available, met the threshold requirements to give rise to a legitimate expectation. 111 The Court stated that in this case the expectation was fulfi lled. 112 With regard to relevant factors outlined in the guidelines, the Court was of the opinion that where the guideline (irrespective of its source) is employed by the decision-maker in the making of the decision or in obtaining guidance for the exercise of discretion, and where the guideline is a relatively comprehensive code with respect to the decision of the exercise of discretion, then the factors listed must be considered.
Agraira has been infl uential in Canadian courts, 113 though only a handful of decisions have relied on it to resolve matters related to legitimate expectations and the (mis)use of guidelines by administrative decision-makers. 114 Of these decisions, only two have considered the substantive effect that guidelines can have when reviewing the reasonableness of an administrative decision-maker ' s exercise of discretion. 115 In Pushparasa , the Federal Court (FC) stated that guidelines are useful in assisting the exercises of discretion (inherent in the decision), and may ' frame an administrative process for it to be reasonable and thus fair ' . 116 In Frankie ' s , the FC stated that broad, fl exible adherence to guidelines set out in Agraira has ' many public benefi ts ' , including ' increased administrative effi ciency, reduced backlogs, decreased scope for arbitrariness and increased certainty and predictability ' . 117 Published guidelines were held to ' serve the useful role of giving rise to legitimate expectations regarding the assessment frameworks that will be followed by a public agency ' , and can serve as a useful indicator of what constitutes a reasonable interpretation of legislation. 118 
Summary of Principles of Legitimate Expectations in Canada
A claimant may have a legitimate expectation to a particular procedure, 119 to have certain criteria considered as relevant, 120 or to a particular substantive outcome. 121 However, one cannot have a legitimate expectation that certain criteria, not made express by pronouncements or conduct of the decision-maker, will not be considered. 122 Legitimate expectations are generated by a public body ' s clear, unambiguous and unqualifi ed conduct. 123 The conduct that can give rise to a legitimate expectation includes established practices, actions, or representations (oral or written, specifi c or general) of the public authority, 124 or a closely related public authority whose guidelines are used in making the decision or guide the exercise of discretion. 125 Also, to give rise to a legitimate expectation, the conduct must be within the scope of the decision-maker ' s statutory authority. 126 These are objective criteria. Finally, there is no requirement of awareness of, or detrimental reliance on, the conduct by the claimant. 127 310 Sas Ansari and Lorne Sossin 128 Old St Boniface (n 52); CAP (n 58); CUPE (n 91); and Agraira (n 103). 129 Old St Boniface (n 52); CAP (n 58); CUPE (n 92); and Agraira (n 103). 130 Baker (n 60). 131 Martineau (n 46). See also Baker (n 60). 132 Baker (n 60); and Agraira (n 103).
As an extension of the rules of procedural fairness, 128 legitimate expectations may both extend procedural protections beyond what the circumstances may otherwise require, 129 and determine what procedures the duty of fairness requires in any circumstances. 130 The conduct of the administrative decision-maker is useful to the courts as an indicator of fairness since it represents the expert administrator ' s view of what constitutes fair procedure in the circumstances. 131 Legitimate expectations relate both to procedural and substantive accountability for decision-making, but result in only procedural remedies.
Although the SCC has stated that legitimate expectations only give rise to procedural protection, there is a range of substantive legal effects that fl ow from legitimate expectations. As part of the Court ' s application of the proper standard of review, the analysis of reasonableness under administrative law appears closely linked to its legitimate expectation reasoning. For example, in Baker , the Court justifi ed its fi nding that the decision-maker had acted unreasonably in part because she failed to consider the applicable guideline. In this way, while legitimate expectations have developed in Canada as a procedural doctrine, the doctrine ' s analytic roots appear to be shared with substantive forms of review. 132 
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN THE TAX ADMINISTRATION CONTEXT
Having explored the sources of soft law in the Canadian tax administration context and the development of legitimate expectations in Canadian administrative law, we now return to explore what impact, if any, legitimate expectations may have in arguably the richest setting of soft law in the Canadian legal system.
Courts ' Current Treatment of CRA Soft Law
There are no SCC decisions that deal with the doctrine of legitimate expectations in the tax administration context. We will however briefl y examine some Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) and Tax Court of Canada (TCC)
decisions. 133 The FCA has consistently held that ' policy guidelines do not create legitimate expectations of substantive rights ' , 134 and has classifi ed taxpayers ' request to have the Minister review the matter in accordance with CRA policies and publications as ' a substantive right, in procedural language ' . 135 CRA publications and materials have no legal force and are not determinative. 136 Taxpayers cannot rely on CRA publications and other administrative positions, and cannot rely on express promises or views expressed to another taxpayer in advance tax rulings (despite the CRA ' s position and consistent practice of regarding such rulings as binding as between the CRA and that particular taxpayer). 137 This body of law, however, pre-dates the most recent developments in the legitimate expectations doctrine and soft law, particularly the Supreme Court ' s decision in Agraira . Older judicial statements about income taxation may also be vestiges of a time where taxation was viewed merely as confi scation of private property by the state -an attitude that, until quite recently, prompted the courts to interpret tax legislation narrowly and strictly as legislation designed to impose penalties. The assumptions and attitudes that underlie an approach holding tax law as ' unique ' warrant critical re-examination in light of the change in the role that income taxation plays in modern, welfare democracies.
Legitimate expectations in the tax setting are framed by a legal context in which each assessment of each individual ' s tax liability in each year is considered afresh. In Ludmer 138 the Federal Court confi rmed that a tax authority was not bound by a concession made in one year to have to make the same concession in other years even if there was no change in law. 139 In other words, by applying the law to a person ' s tax liability one way in one year, no legitimate expectation is created on which that person can rely to suggest that similar approaches are taken in the future. This is because the tax authority is authorised to assess each individual taxation year independently, 140 making an assessment conclusive only for the year to which it applies, and allowing the tax authority to take a different view in a different year. 141 So long as these inconsistent assessments are issued in good faith and are supported by the law, the courts will not interfere.
Aside from this case specifi c approach, the doctrine of legitimate expectations is treated the same way in tax administration as in the SCC decisions. Just as estoppel generally cannot lie with respect to an opinion or interpretation of the law, 142 and cannot lie where it is invoked to prevent the exercise of a statutory duty or the application of law, 143 legitimate expectations cannot compel a particular application of the Income Tax Act . 144 Rather, guidelines issued by the CRA are held to refl ect government policy as to the meaning and scope of the legislation. 145 The Courts have viewed the interpretation of the Act as their responsibility, and that government policy as refl ected in soft law cannot bind that interpretive role. 146 On this basis, the FCA has stated that the Minister is not bound in the present or the future by CRA ' s guidelines. 147 However, a taxpayer may use the CRA ' s guidelines to support an argument that the interpretation in the guidelines is correct. 148 In this sense, soft law in this context has legal relevance, even if not enforceable per se. Can soft law by itself ground an argument of unreasonableness or unfairness ? The short answer in Canada now appears to be affi rmative on both fronts. That said, the circumstances in which guidelines or other forms of soft law play a role in legal consequences remains to be fully explored.
For example, in the voluntary disclosure programme, which uses the discretion of the Minister to waive interest and penalties, several cases have held the Minister to the conditions for and the substantive relief promised in the applicable Information Circular. In Karia, 149 the FC held that although Information Circulars are not delegated legislation and have no force of law of Law within which the more specifi c ideals … are subsumed … .Where a society is marked by a culture of justifi cation, an exercise of public power is only appropriate where it can be justifi ed to citizens in terms of rationality and fairness … The Rule of Law, in short, can speak in several voices so long as the resulting chorus echoes its underlying values of rationality and fairness (emphasis added). 163 An ' ethos of justifi cation ' includes the idea that ' arbitrary state action [is] impermissible ' such that ' the exercise of power must be [ … ] justifiable and justifi ed ' so that citizens see, 164 through the fog of government action, the ' underlying values of rationality and fairness ' . 165 In Canadian administrative law, procedural fairness, substantive review for reasonableness or correctness (depending on the standard of review), and monitoring of jurisdiction together serve to advance and promote a culture of justifi cation. 166 The intersection of soft law and legitimate expectations can advance the project of justifi cation in several ways. Specifi cally, by recognising that soft law can give rise to legitimate expectations, the Supreme Court has opened up new avenues for enhancing the transparency and accountability of administrative action. At least in the circumstances confi rmed in Agraira (but perhaps more broadly), guidelines of the kind discussed in this chapter in relation to tax administration can give rise to enforceable expectations. Soft law and legitimate expectations provide a framework for ensuring greater consistency and coherence in the exercise of discretion -and where it can be justifi ed, also ensure transparency if and when administrative decision-makers depart from guidelines and other policy instruments.
Legitimate expectations invite greater attentiveness to context in the review of administrative action. Administrative bodies come in all manner of confi gurations of powers, duties, obligations, purposes and roles. They combine, in various ways, administrative, investigatory, and judicial roles in pursuit of effi cient, effective, and even-handed implementation of government goals. Given this variety, courts should consider a number of factors when considering the legal effect to be given to soft law instruments. While it is premature to describe exhaustively the scope and nature of these factors, the goal of advancing the ' ethos of justifi cation ' suggests at least some Legitimate Expectations in Canada 317 of these considerations. For example, where the legislation applies to the general public, a vulnerable sub-group of the public, where it applies irrespective of deliberate action by the person, where the statute is complex or voluminous, where the words conferring the discretionary power are general or broad, where the nature of the discretion is punitive or relieving, and where the consequences of mistakes can have signifi cant effects on the person ' s daily life, soft law instruments are more likely to be useful, consulted, and relied on. They ought therefore to be given greater consideration by courts when the guideline supports or favours the private person ' s position or interest. Further, where the instrument sets out a procedure to be followed and the conditions under which discretionary power will be exercised, guidelines ought to be given greater weight.
While the potential of legitimate expectations in relation to soft law is signifi cant, as demonstrated by the setting of tax administration, considerable uncertainty remains. The sharp distinction drawn in Canadian administrative law between the procedural and substantive implications of legitimate expectations is diffi cult to sustain. The analysis of relevant factors in the legitimate expectations analysis in the context of soft law remains largely undeveloped. In our view, the importance and variability of soft law in the administrative state will continue to drive the development of legitimate expectations. Canadian administrative law is poised to develop a more coherent and transparent doctrine of legitimate expectations. At the same time, a richer understanding of legitimate expectations can serve as a vital catalyst for sorting out the place of soft law within broader rule of law commitments.
